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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction lies in this Court pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 3 of the Utah constitution and U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following issues are presented for review:
1.

Did

Associated

Title,

a title

company

acting

as

trustee under a deed of trust, have authority at a trustee's
sale

to

purchase

the

trust

property

on

behalf

of

beneficiary, Bodell Construction, the plaintiff-appellant

the
in

this action?
2.

Does

the

grant

of

"full

and

complete

authority

regarding this foreclosure action," with the understanding that
title

to

the

trust

property

would

be

transferred

to

the

beneficiary, imply authority in the trustee to complete the
trustee's sale?
3.

Did

the

trustee, Associated

Title, have

apparent

authority to complete the sale?
4.

Did

the

plaintiff-appellant,

Bodell

Construction

Company, ratify the trustee's sale?
5.
trustee's

Does

a beneficiary

have

discretion

to abrogate a

sale when it is discovered that the sale was not

advantageous to it?

STATUTES M P CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Snelson does not contend that the interpretation of any
stature or rule of procedure is determinative.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Bodell

Construction

filed

its

complaint

to

recover

a

deficiency after a trustee's sale of real property situated in
Utah County.

The defendants moved for summary judgment on the

ground that plaintiff had conducted two trustee's sales, and was
bound by the first at which it had bid in the entire debt owed
by defendants.
for

summary

(R. 231-235.)

judgment

Plaintiff filed a cross-motion

contending

that Associated

trustee, had no authority to bid at the sale.

Title, the

(R. 190-210.)

Summary Judgment was entered in favor of the defendants in May,
1987.

(R.268.)

Bodell's appeal of that decision to the Supreme

Court was dismissed because of lack of a Rule 54(b) order.
(R.4 62.)

The trial court allowed the parties to augment the

record and, after a second hearing, entered

an order

again

determining that plaintiff was bound by the first trustee's sale
and granting summary

judgment to defendants.

(R.5 68.)

The

trial court included in its Order a Rule 54 (b) determination of
finality.

This case was transferred from the Supreme Court to

the Court of Appeals on June 25, 1990.

STATEMENT QF FACTS
FACTUAL OVERVIEW

In the District Court, and in Appellant's Brief, Bodell
grounds his argument for the invalidity of the trustee's sale on
the confusion that arose among him and his agents concerning the
price to be bid at the sale.

The district court concluded that
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these purported "disputed facts" did not contradict or raise any
issues as to the material facts upon which defendants relied,
and that the undisputed facts showed that plaintiff's agent had
actual and apparent

authority to enter the bid.

Moreover,

plaintiff had ratified the sale after he had full knowledge of
the facts surrounding it.
The following summary of the facts and arguments that were
germane to the motion for summary judgment, place in context the
uncontested facts that follow.
Michael Bodell is a principal of plaintiff-appellant Bodell
Construction Company, Inc. (Bodell Depo. R.58 9 at 7.)

Both are

sometimes referred to hereinafter as "Bodell." Landmark Mortgage
Company is owned and controlled by Roger Terry and engages in
the mortgage brokering and arranging business.
R.587 at 6, 8.)

(Terry Depo.

Associated Title Company is a title company

that sometimes acts as trustee and conducts trustee's
under trust deeds.
Title Company.

sales

Blake Heiner is an employee of Associated

(Heiner Depo. R. 588 at 4-6.)

Roger Terry

("Terry") and his company, Landmark Mortgage

Company ("Landmark"), arranged and brokered a $200,000 mortgage
loan

from

McOmbers,

Bodell

Construction

to

defendants

Snelson

and

Property owned by McOmber was conveyed by trust deed

to a trustee to secure the loan.
(Associated

Title

was

a

(Bodell Depo. R.589 at 14-15.)

successor

trustee.)

Snelson

and

McOmbers were unable to pay as agreed, and Bodell instructed

3

Landmark

and the title company of its choice to initiate a

foreclosure of the Trust Deed securing the loan.
R.589 at 25-26.)

(Bodell Depo.

Pursuant to Bodell's authorization, Terry

hired Associated Title Company to act as trustee on Bodellfs
behalf in connection with the foreclosure.

At the trustee's

sale, Associated Title bid the full amount then owed on behalf
of

Bodell

Construction.

Bodell

thereafter

unsuccessfully

attempted to sell the property for about the same amount.

Being

unable to do so, Bodell spoke to his lawyer, who suggested that
Bodell

(1) claim that the trustee was unauthorized to bid the

full loan amount, (2) rescind the original sale, (3) conduct a
new sale at a lower price, and
deficiency.

(Bodell

Depo.

(4) sue the borrowers for a

R.589

at

84-89.)

This

was

accomplished, and after the new sale at the lesser price, Bodell
initiated this deficiency action against McOmbers and Snelson.
UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT

At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment after the
record was augmented, Bodell did not contradict
following facts.

any of the

Indeed, at the outset of the oral argument,

his attorney said:
Both parties have represented there's no issues
of material fact. We both argued that. I'm not
inclined to believe that's true at the present
time, but having previously said it, I'm not
going to retreat from my position.
(Transcript
following

of Hearing, R.590 at 6.)

facts

are based

Virtually

on the deposition
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all of the

of Mr. Bodell

himself,

except

statements

going

to

the

formality

of

the

trusteefs sale.
1.

Roger Terry and Landmark Mortgage had arranged 8 to 12

mortgage loans for Bodell.

All were handled in basically the

same manner—Terry brought Bodell a loan application package
describing the prospective loan, assisted in the closing of the
loan,

serviced

the

loan

by

collecting

payments,

handled

communications on behalf of Bodell with the owner/debtor, and,
when foreclosure was necessary, Terry handled it for Bodell.
(Bodell

Depo.

2.

In

R.589

at

15-17.)

late

1983, Roger

Terry

arranged the subject loan for Bodell.
the McOmbers and Snelson.

and

Landmark

Mortgage

Bodell loaned $200,000 to

Among other things, Terry gave Bodell

an appraisal showing that the McOmber house was worth $300,000.
Bodell himself did not look at the property before making the
loan.

(Bodell Depo. R.589 at 14-15, 18.) The loan was to bear

18 percent per annum as interest and was secured by the McOmber
residence.
3.
loan

and

(Bodell Depo. R.589 at 14-15 and Depo. Exhibit 2.)

McOmbers and Snelson did not make a payment under the
so

Bodell

caused

foreclosure

proceedings

to

be

initiated. (Bodell Depo. R.589 at 24-25.)
4.

Bodell directed Terry to assist him in proceeding with

foreclosure.
delivered

(Bodell Depo. R.589

to Terry

at 25.)

a letter addressed

He drafted

to Landmark

Company dated January 9, 1984, which stated as follows:

5

and

mortgage

Gentlemen,
Please accept this letter as authorization to
immediately begin foreclosure against the
property associated with this loan.
We hereby grant you and the title

tall

your choice

company

and complete

of

authority

regarding this foreclosure action.
Please inform
information.

me

if

you

require

further

Very truly yours,
s/Michael J. Bodell

[Emphasis added.]

(Bodell Depo. R.589 at 25-27 and Depo. Exhibit 5.)

Bodell knew

that Terry was going to give this letter to a title company and
assumed that the title company would rely on it. (Bodell Depo.
R.589

at

Company.
5.
Trustee,

26.)

Terry

gave

this

letter

to

Associated

Title

(Terry Depo. R.587 at 40.)
During April, 1984, Bodell signed a Substitution of
appointing

Associated

Title

trustee under the McOmber Trust Deed.

Company

as

successor

(Bodell Depo. R.589 at

34-35.)
6.

In early May, 1984, Bodell requested that Terry furnish

him with the appraisal on the McOmber property that was a part
of the loan application package because Bodell wanted some idea
of the value of the property being foreclosed.

(Bodell Depo.

R.589 at 39-40.) That appraisal indicated that the value of the
McOmber property was $300,000.
Exhibit

(Bodell Depo. R.589 at 18; Depo.

1.) Bodell received no other appraisal prior to the

trustee's sale.

(Bodell Depo. R.589 at 40.)
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7.

Associated Title Company issued a Notice of Trustee's

Sale under the McOmber Trust Deed on July 30, 1984.
of Trustee's

Sale

scheduled

the

(Bodell Depo. R.589, Exhibit

sale

That Notice

for August

11.) Associated

31, 1984.

Title

Company

mailed the Notice of Trustee's Sale both to Landmark Mortgage
Company

and to Bodell on July

31, 1984, and both

Landmark

Mortgage Company and Bodell received the Notice of Trustee's
Sale on August 1, 1984.
8.

(Bodell Depo. R.589 at 44-45 and 110.)

Bodell knew, prior to August 31, 1984, that there was

going to be a trustee's sale under the McOmber Trust Deed at
that time.

(Bodell Depo. R.589 at 45.)

Bodell expected that

Bodell Construction would buy the property at the sale. (Bodell
Depo. R.589 at 52.) Nevertheless, (1) Bodell never spoke with
anyone at Associated Title Company prior to the sale and (2)
Bodell did not convey any bidding instructions to Landmark or
Terry prior to the sale.

Bodell knew that Associated Title

Company could not have received any bidding instructions prior
to the

sale.

(Bodell Depo. R.589

at

47-48,

52, and

57.)

Bodell had a number of conversations with Mr. and Mrs. McOmber
and their attorney in reference to the pending sale.
Depo. R.58 9 at 4 6.)
Terry

(IA.

Roger Terry

at 46-47) .

(Bodell

He had several conversations with Roger
He made all of his arrangements with

(Bodell Depo. R.589 at 48, 109) .

This was the

largest second mortgage loan Bodell had made by far (Bodell Depo
R.589 at 109).
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9.
that

The testimony differed as to the bidding instructions

were

given

to

Associated

Title

Company.

There

were

disputed facts in this area, but these facts were irrelevant to
the motion for summary judgment before the district court.

The

parties' differing versions are included here only because they
will be helpful to the Court's understanding of the overall
facts and because

appellant

Bodell bases his arguments

for

Associated Title's lack of authority to bid entirely on the
purported confusion among him, Mr. Terry and Mr. Heiner.
(a)

Associated asserts that it telephoned Terry or his
office and requested instructions as to what should
be

bid

at

received

a

the

trustee's

telephone

sale

message

and

thereafter

stating

payoff at the sale was to be $243,127.15.

that

the

(Heiner

Depo. R.588 at 9-10.)
(b)

Terry asserts that Associated requested a "payoff,"
and Terry
"payoff
under

called Associated

amount," which
the

commission

loan,
on

the

was

including
loan

Title

Company with a

the

full

amount

a

part

of

Terry's

then

unpaid.

that

was

owed

(Terry Depo. R.587 at 56; Affidavit of Roger Terry
(Terry Depo. R.587 Exhibit 24).)
(c)

Bodell asserts that Associated should have bid the
fair

market

value

of

the

property,

that he gave no one any bidding

8

but

concedes

instructions

and

that no one ever told Associated Title Company what
the fair market value was. (Bodell Depo. R.589 at
62-65.)
10.

The trustee's sale was conducted on August 31, 1984,

and Associated made a bid $243,681.90 on behalf of Bodell and
purchased the property for Bodell Construction.

(Bodell Depo.

R.589, Exhibit 14.)
11.

On September 4, 1984, Blake Heiner signed a Trustee's

Deed on behalf of Associated Title by which Associated Title
conveyed to Bodell Construction the McOmber property
Depo. R. 587, Exhibit 16).
County

Recorder's

Office

(Terry

This Deed was recorded at the Utah
on

September

11, 1984

(III.)

The

Trustee's Deed recites, and Heiner confirmed by his examination
of the documents prior to his deposition, that the sale was
conducted in full compliance with Utah statutes (Heiner Depo. R.
588, at 35).
12.

Within a week to ten days after the sale on August 31,

1984, Bodell was told by Terry that the sale had occurred and
that approximately

$240,000 had been bid

(Bodell Depo. R. 589 at 67-68.)

for the property.

Bodell testified that, in the

same conversation, he objected to the amount bid by Associated
Title Company.
13.

(Bodell Depo. R. 589 at 79-80.)

After learning of the sale and bid amount, Bodell

contacted Cal Monson, a realtor, to list and sell the property.
Bodell,

as owner,

signed

a Listing

9

Agreement

with Monson,

authorizing Monson to sell the property for $239,000.
Depo. R. 589 at 70-72, Exhibit

16.) When Bodell

(Bodell

signed the

Listing Agreement as owner, he knew that Bodell Construction
owned the property because it had purchased it at a trustee's
sale, that the bid price had been wrong at that trustee's sale,
and that Bodell did not like the bid.

(Bodell Depo. R. 589 at

71, 80.)
14.

During late September, 1984, Bodell received

from

Roger Terry a rent check in the amount of $200.00 from Jeff and
Kathy Kober, who were renting the bottom portion of the McOmber
home. Bodell cashed the check.

(Bodell Depo. R.589 at 73-74,

Exhibit 17.) At the time he cashed the check, Bodell understood
that the money was rent from people who lived in the basement of
the property that he had purchased at a foreclosure sale, that
the bid price was wrong at the foreclosure sale, and that he
objected to that bid price.
15.

(Bodell Depo. R. 589 at 74, 80.)

If someone had approached Bodell on September 12, 1984

(after Bodell knew of the trustee's sale and the amount bid at
that sale), and offered to purchase the property for $239,000 in
cash, he would have sold it to them.

(Bodell Depo. R. 589 at

72-73.)
16.

During early October, 1984, Bodell became concerned

about whether the property was worth what had been bid for it,
and so Bodell called his attorney, Richard Rappaport, "because I
wanted to know what we do now that it's becoming obvious to me
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that the property isn't going to solve my debt problem.

Isn't

going to be, isn't going to net us anywhere near what is owed
us. So the next step was, well, how do we get the difference."
(Bodell Depo. R. 589 at 77-78.)
On October 3, 1984, Bodell and Terry met with Bodell f s

17.
counsel,

Richard

Rappaport.

At

that

meeting,

according

to

Terry's notes, with which Bodell agrees, "Mr. Rappaport said to
get bid down must claim trustee did not have authority to bid
amount he did." (Bodell Depo. R.589 at 82-83, Exhibit 13.)
18.

Thereafter, Rappaport, Bodell, and Terry attempted to

undo the effects of the first trustee's sale:
(a)

Mr.

Rappaport

instructed

Mr.

Terry

to

call

the

McOmbers and tell them that an error was made and
that they could stay in the house

(b)

for another

days.

(Bodell Depo. R. 58 9 at 84, Exhibit 13.)

Bodell

also instructed

Terry to tell McOmbers

30

to

keep the home on the market but that the ownership
listing

would

have

to

be

changed

(to

reflect

McOmbers as owner, rather than Bodell, as owner).
(Bodell Depo. R. 589 at 85, Exhibit 13.)
(c)

McOmbers did in fact execute a Listing Agreement as
owners

with

Cal

Monson

dated

October

4,

1984.

(Bodell Depo. R. 589 at 85, Exhibit 18.)
(d)

Mr. Rappaport directed Associated Title Company to
record

a Quit

Claim

II

Deed

conveying

the

property

from Bodell Construction Company back to Associated
Title

Company,

as

trustee,

so

that

another

trustee's sale could be conducted. (Bodell Depo. R.
589 at 94, Exhibit 19.)
(e)

Bodell secured a new appraisal, dated November
1984,

to determine

property.
(f)

the

fair market

value

thereafter

conducted

a

sale of the property on November

second

of Blake T. Heiner, 1
were

undisputed

Title

trustee's

19, 1984 and, at

the direction of Bodell, bid $170,000.

facts

the

(Bodell Depo. R.589 at 95.)

At the request of Mr. Rappaport, Associated
Company

These

of

6,

(Affidavit

6.)

before

the

District

Court.

The

"disputed facts" that appellant has raised in its brief go only
to Bodell, Terry and Heiner's purported misunderstanding
the bid price.

about

The undisputed material facts show clearly that

defendants-appellees

were entitled to judgment

as a matter of

law.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The first trustee's sale conducted on August 31, 1984 was
valid and binding on Bodell.
had

authority

to

enter

Bodell's agent, Associated Title

a bid.

Bodell

had

written

a

letter

granting Landmark Mortgage "and the title company of your choice
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full and complete authority regarding this foreclosure action,"
and

Landmark

had

chosen

Associated

Title

to

handle

the

foreclosure.
Not only did Associated Title have the express authority
created by the letter, but it also had implied authority, that
is, authority incidental to the broader authority given.

Bodell

authorized and directed his agents to complete the foreclosure
and effect the transfer of the title to Bodell Construction.
This could not have been accomplished without bidding at the
trustee's sale.

Although there was some confusion between him

and his agents and between Landmark Mortgage and Associated
Title concerning the amount to be bid, the claims that have
arisen from this confusion are between Bodell and his agents.
Associated Title also had apparent authority to make the
bid.

It was clothed with the appearance of authority by Bodell,

the defendant-trustors
would

be

interest
These

held

and

(McOmber) were given notice that a sale

Bodell

negotiated

with

them,

and

their

in the trust property was terminated by the sale.

facts

satisfy

the

requirements

of

(1)

acts

by

the

principal (Bodell), (2) reliance by the third person (McOmber),
and (3) a change in the third persons circumstances.
Bodell ratified Associated Title's acts and the trustee's
sale.

After learning of the sale and the price bid at it,

Bodell did not object to Associated Title but proceeded to treat
the property as Bodell Construction's by listing it for sale in

13

Bodell

Construction's

name, by negotiating

with McOmber

to

remain in the property pending sale, and by accepting rents from
the property.

Bodell testified that if someone had offered him

the $239,000 for which he had listed the property, he would have
sold it.

It was only when he decided that the property was not

worth what he listed it for that Bodell decided to claim his
trustee acted beyond his authority.
Bodell cannot declare that the first sale was invalid and
hold a second
trustors.

for his own benefit to the prejudice

of the

The procedural requirements for trustee's sales are

intended to protect the debtor/trustors, and there is a strong
presumption

of the validity

of a trustee's

sale unless the

interests of the trustor are prejudiced by an

irregularity.

There is no claim here of procedural irregularity; the sale
conformed in all respect with statutory requirements.

Bodell

was motivated to abrogate the first sale not by any procedural
problems, but

only when

it became

"obvious to me that

the

property isn't going to solve my debt problem . . . .

So the

next step was, well, how do we get the difference."

(Bodell

Depo. R.589 at 77-78.)

The answer to this question is recorded

in a note made by Roger Terry of a meeting on October 3, 1984,
between Bodell, Terry and Bodell's attorney:

"Mr. Rappaport

said to get bid down must claim trustee did not have authority
to bid amount he did."

(Bodell Depo. R.589 at 82, Exhibit 13.)
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Bodell testified "That in essence is the way I remember it."
(Bodell Depo. R.589 at 83.)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE UNDISPUTED FACTS BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT SHOWED
THAT ASSOCIATED TITLE HAD ACTUAL AUTHORITY TO ENTER THE BID

The actual authority of an agent to act on behalf of his
principal may be either express or implied.
95 Idaho 10, 501 P.2d 278, 279-280

Clark v. Gneiting,

(1972).

The Utah Supreme

Court has said:
The actual authority of an agent may be implied
from the words and conduct of the parties and
the fact and circumstances attending the
transaction in question.
Implied authority
embraces authority to do whatever acts are

incidental
proper

to

authority

La* or axe necessary, usual, and
accomplish

or

perform,

the

main

expressly delegated Lo Lh£ agent.

[Emphasis added.]
Bowen v. 01senr 576 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1978).

In B & R Supply

Co. v. Brinahurst. 28 Utah 2d 442, 503 P.2d 1216, 1217 (1972)
the court said:
[W]here a principal . . . entrusts a duty to his
agent or employee, the latter is clothed with
implied authority to do those things which are
within the scope of assigned
duties
or
reasonably and necessarily incident thereto.
This is black-letter law.
The Restatement

see, 2A C.J.S. "Agency" §154 at 779.

(Second) of Agency, § 35, states the rule as

follows:

§ 35 When Incidental Authority is Inferred
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Unless otherwise agreed, authority to conduct a
transaction include authority to do acts which
are incidental to it, usually accompany it, or
are reasonably necessary to accomplish it.
Applying these principles to the case at hand, Associated Title
clearly had implied actual authority to enter the bid at the
August 29, 1984 Trustee's sale.
In

the

Undisputed

letter
Material

quoted

in

Facts,

full

supra,

at

Paragraph

Michael

J.

4 of

the

Bodell, the

principal of plaintiff appellant Bodell Construction, granted to
Landmark

"and the title

company

of your

choice

complete authority regarding this foreclosure action."
Depo. R. 589, Exhibit 5.)

full

and

(Bodell

There are no expressed restrictions

on this full and complete authority or implied

restrictions

elsewhere in the letter or in the conduct and actions of the
parties thereafter.
Bodell argues that the grant of authority was limited by
the words of the letter granting authorization "to immediately
begin foreclosure."

(Brief of Appellant at 14.)

However, Mr.

Bodell paid close attention to the foreclosure proceedings, was
in frequent contact with Mr. Terry about the progress of the
foreclosure, often phoned Mr. McOmber, who had conveyed the
property as collateral and lived in the house, was aware that
the trustee's sale would occur when it did, and, even though he
was out of town on that day, phoned immediately when he returned
to inquire about the sale.

(Bodell Depo. R.589 at 45, 107-114.)

It is not credible that the letter granting "full and complete
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authority" was meant to limit that grant to only the beginning
of the foreclosure proceedings.

The plain words of the letter

do not bear this meaning.
Certainly, Mr. Bodell did not act on the premise that
authority

to

conduct

beginning steps.

the

foreclosure

was

limited

to

its

He relied on Mr. Terry and Associated Title

throughout the foreclosure procedures from their inception to
the time the Trustee's deed was recorded.
Although

the

grant

of

authority

is

not

ambiguous,

Restatement (Second) of Agency § 42 bears on Bodellfs argument:
If the
authorization
is ambiguous,
the
interpretation acted on by the parties controls.
The comment to § 42 states:
The subsequent conduct of the parties to an
agreement with reference to it is determinative,
unless it is so clearly expressed in view of the
attendant
circumstances
that
it
cannot
reasonably be given the interpretation which the
parties indicate by their conduct.
The grant of authority at issue here was clear in its initial
statement in the January 9, 1984 letter, and the conduct of the
parties

was

consistent

with

it throughout

the

foreclosure

proceedings.
At pages 19 through 23 of the Brief of Appellant, Bodell
argues that the custom and usage of the title business did not
authorize Associated Title to purchase the property on behalf of
Bodell.

The defendants never relied on any custom or usage in
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their

motion

for

summary

judgment;

these

arguments

are

irrelevant.
Michael Bodell authorized the purchase of the property for
Bodell Construction

at the trustee's

sale.

There was

some

alleged confusion about what price should be bid at the sale.
Bodell has brought a separate action

in the Third

Judicial

District claiming that Associated Title negligently entered the
bid that extinguished the debt.

This controversy, however, is

between Associated Tittle and Bodell; it does not involve the
defendant in this action.
There was no dispute in the record that Bodell expected
Roger Terry to get the complete the foreclosure for him:
Q

And you knew that if Bodell wanted to bid
on the property at the sale someone had to
bid for it, correct?

A

I can't remember specifically with that at
the time.
But somebody had to do
something. It wasn't just going to happen
alone. I knew that.

Q

What arrangements did you make to ensure
that somebody would appear at the sale or
that somebody would bid at the sale for you
or that—to assure that the interest of
Bodell would be taken care of at the sale.
What arrangements did you make:

A

The only arrangements I personally made was
conversations with Roger that it was being
handled that I can remember.

(Bodell Depo. R.589 at 48.)

IS

As authorized in the January 9 letter, Roger Terry and the
title company of his choice were to do whatever was necessary to
protect Bodell's interest and complete the foreclosure:
Q

Did you direct anybody to do whatever you
had in your mind to appear on your behalf
and protect your interests at the sale?

A

Yes, I think that would be fair.

Q

Who?

A

Roger Terry.
Make sure
parties were doing that.

Q

Anybody else?

A

Not that I can think of.

that

the

right

(Bodell Depo. R.589 at 52.)
Although he claims not to have known exactly what would
transpire

at

the

trustee's

sale, he

did

know

that

Construction would buy the property at the sale:
Q

Did you expect Bodell Construction to buy
the property at the sale?

A

Yes.

Q

How did you think that was going to happen?

A

I didn't know the specific mechanics at the
time, but again I can't remember what I was
think right then. But with what I now know
and so forth it would be fair to say that I
knew there would be some kind of an auction
or process whereby we got deeded over the
land.
I knew there had been a posting in
the neighborhood and something to that
effect.

Q

Did
you
ever
give
Mr.
Terry
any
instructions or authority to bid on your
behalf at the sale?
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Bodell

A

No.

Q

Did you give anybody any instructions or
authority to bid on your behalf at the ale?

A

Not that I can think of. I was never asked
about bid amount at the sale.

Q

Again,
the
only
person
you
were
communicating with on these subjects of the
sale and bidding and the like were Mr.
Terry; is that right?

A

That is correct, at that point in time.

Q

Okay. Based upon everything that happened
before the scheduled sale date what did you
think was going to appear at that sale?

A

I think we've discussed that before.
I
don't know the exact mechanics, but again
there was going to be a legal process
whereby we either got paid off or we
acquired the property.

Q

Did you know any more than that?

A

I just can't honestly say.
I am sure I
knew something more than that.

(Bodell Depo. R.589 at 52-54.)
Clearly, Mr. Bodell was leaving much of the "mechanics" of
the foreclosure to his agents.

He expected obtain title to

property, and this is what he instructed his agents to do for
him.

Perhaps Mr. Terry or Associated Title should have given

him advice he did not get, or perhaps they performed their
duties as Bodell's agents in a careless or negligent fashion,
but they did do what he had authorized them to do.
The
without

property
a

bid

at

could
the

not

have

trustee's

been
sale.

obtained

Associated

understood that it had authority to make the bid.
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for

Bodell
Title

Q

What was your understanding
[July 9, 1986 letter.]

A

I understood that to mean that Landmark
Mortgage, Roger Terry, and Associated Title
had complete authority granted from Bodell
to
conduct
the
foreclosure
without
reservation.

Q

You never understood that Associated Title
had authority to determine what was going
to be bid at the sale, did you?

A

Well, reading this letter it could be
interpreted as saying that yes, we did have
that authority. It is not our practice to
do so, however, or was not the practice in
this case.

Q

You didn't
authority.

A

We would have not exercised that authority
in any case. But the clear language of the
letter gives us that authority or gives
Associated Title that authority by way of
Landmark Mortgage.

Q

So it's your interpretation that this
letter
gives
you
authority
whether
exercised or not to determine the amount of
the bid at the sale.

A

Correct.

Q

And you would have had that authority
without any need to go to the beneficiary
of the trust deed for any amount?

A

That's correct.

Q

And is it your contention then
Landmark had that same authority?

A

Yes.

understand

(Heiner Dep R.5887 at 21-22.)
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that

of

that?

you had that

that

Associated Title also thought that it had obtained a price
to be bid at the sale.
Associated

(Heiner Dep R.588 at 9-10.)

Title would not have made

unauthorized.

a bid

Clearly,

it thought

was

However, whether the bid price was authorized is

between Mr. Bodell and Mr. Terry, and Associated Title.

There

can be no question that Landmark Mortgage and Associated Tittle
were authorized and instructed to obtain title to the property
pursuant to the deed of trust.

To do this, a bid was necessary,

and the authority to make it must be implied as part of the
entire process.
Comment b. to Restatement

(Second) of Agency § 35 ("When

Incidental Authority is Inferred" quoted above) states:
b.
It is seldom that the words of a
principal are sufficiently specific to include
or exclude all the acts which he expects the
agent to do or not to do.
In most cases the
principal
does
not
think
of,
far
less
specifically
direct, the
series
of acts
necessary to accomplish his objects. Almost all
directions are ambiguous without knowledge of
the background in which they are given.
All
include by implication authorization to do what
is necessary in order to accomplish the end.
The specific words which the principal uses must

tie interpreted

sn

that

accomplished by the agent.

his ob jeot

can he.

(Emphasis added.)

If Associated Title had not been authorized to make a bid,
it could not have accomplished what Bodell wanted it to do, and
the entire foreclosure procedure would be in vain.
stated in Comment c. to § 35:
c.
The rule stated in this Section applies
more broadly to the authorization of a general
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As is

Associated Title also thought that it had obtained a price
to be bid at the sale.
Associated

(Heiner Dep R.588 at 9-10.)

Title would not have made a bid

unauthorized.

Clearly,

it thought

was

However, whether the bid price was authorized is

between Mr. Bodell and Mr. Terry, and Associated Title.

There

can be no question that Landmark Mortgage and Associated Tittle
were authorized and instructed to obtain title to the property
pursuant to the deed of trust.

To do this, a bid was necessary,

and the authority to make it must be implied as part of the
entire process.
Comment b. to Restatement

(Second) of Agency § 35 ("When

Incidental Authority is Inferred" quoted above) states:
b.
It is seldom that the words of a
principal are sufficiently specific to include
or exclude all the acts which he expects the
agent to do or not to do.
In most cases the
principal
does
not
think
of,
far
less
specifically
direct, the series of acts
necessary to accomplish his objects. Almost all
directions are ambiguous without knowledge of
the background in which they are given.
All
include by implication authorization to do what
is necessary in order to accomplish the end.

The specific words which the principal uses must
h£ interpreted ss thai h±s object can he.
accomplished by the agent.

(Emphasis added.)

If Associated Title had not been authorized to make a bid,
it could not have accomplished what Bodell wanted it to do, and
the entire foreclosure procedure would be in vain.
stated in Comment c. to § 35:
c.
The rule stated in this Section applies
more broadly to the authorization of a general
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As is

agent than to that of a special agent,
applies in the latter case also.
In
case, it is inferred that the principal
doing a vain thing, but intends to
workable and effective consent.
It

but it
either
is not
give a
is not

essential to the authorization of an act that
the principal should have contemplated that the
agent would perform it as incidental to
authorized performance. (Emphasis added.)

the

Indeed, Bodell's argument that he had not authorized the
bid rests essentially on the fact that he did not contemplate
the bid specifically when he told Terry

(and through Terry,

Associated Title), to get the foreclosure completed.
Throughout

these proceedings, Bodell has

insisted

that

Associated Title had actual authority to do everything necessary
to complete the Trustee's sale that would divest the McOmbers of
title and transfer title to Bodell, except make a bid at the
Trustee's
Associated

Sale.

Such

a

Title would be

restriction

on

the

authority

illogical and unworkable.

of

Quite

clearly, to complete the sale and effect the transfer of title,
the explicit

grant of "full and complete authority"

in the

January 9, 1984 letter must include the implied authority to bid
at the sale.

No other conclusion is reasonably possible.

In Q.S. Stapley Co. v. Logan. 6 Ariz.App. 269, 431 P.2d
910, 913 (1967), the court said: "Well established in the law is
the proposition that a principal cannot escape liability by
leaving his business in the hands of agents, then denying their
authority act for him."

This is exactly what Bodell wishes to
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do in the present case to avoid the effects of the original
trustee's sale of August 31, 1984.
POINT II
ASSOCIATED TITLE HAD APPARENT AUTHORITY
TO MAKE THE BID OF AUGUST 31 r

1984

In addition to the necessarily implied authority to make
the bid to complete the foreclosure, all of the elements of
apparent authority were present as well.

For at least one month

before the Trustee's Sale, Bodell was in frequent communication
with defendant

McOmber, who resided in the house, and Bodell

communicated frequently with Mr. McOmberfs attorney.
Trustee's
divested

Sale, Bodell
of

title

and

took

the position

Bodell

thereupon

that

After the

McOmber

signed

a

was

listing

agreement to sell the house and collected and cashed rent checks
from tenants in the basement of the house.
In his Brief of Appellant, Bodell sets forth the three
elements necessary to find apparent authority:
1.

Acts or conduct of the principal (Bodell);

2.

Reliance on those acts by a third
(here, McOmber or Snelson); and

3.

A resulting change in position by the third
person. 2A C.J.S. Agency §157.

person

(Brief of Appellant at 24.)
Here, all of these criteria are met.

First, Mr. Bodell

granted full and complete authority to Associated Title and had
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several

telephone

conversations

with

Mr.

McOmber

and

his

attorney about matters incident to the upcoming trustee's sale.
Second,

Mr. McOmber

obviously

relied

on

the

authority

Associated Title by performing acts that indicated

of

title had

been divested from him, relinquishing the rent checks to Mr.
Bodell, not resisting the transfer of names on the

listing

agreement, and, before the sale, negotiating with Mr. Bodell as
though the upcoming Trustee's Sale was to be a valid sale.
Third, Mr. McOmber obviously changed his position, namely having
title to the property divested from him.

in Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones, 672 p.2d 73 (Utah
1983), the court said that apparent authority exists where "a
person has created such an appearance of things that it causes a
third party reasonably and prudently to believe that a second
party has the power to act on behalf of the first person."

672

P.2d at 75, citing Wynn v. McMahon Ford Co.r Mo.App. 414 S.W.2d
330,

336

(1967) .

In these circumstances, it would have been

imprudent for Mr. McOmber to believe anything else.
Bodell attempts to circumvent the first element of the
apparent authority argument

(acts by the principal) by arguing

that Snelson never had any contact with Bodell (the principal)
and

that

McOmber

Title's authority.

(the trustor)

never

discussed

(Brief of Appellant at 25.)

Associated

Snelson was the

co-maker on the note, not the trustor, and with respect to the
trustee's sale, his knowledge would have no bearing.
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If it were

necessary to show that the third person (McOmber) "spoke with"
the principal about the agent's authorityf there would never be
a

question

of apparent

authority

raised.

All

cases

would

involve express authority or the lack thereof.
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 49 states:
§

49.
Interpretation of Apparent Authority
Compared with Interpretation of Authority

The rules applicable to the interpretation of
authority are applicable to the interpretation
of apparent authority except that:
(a) manifestations of the principal to the
other party to the transaction are interpreted
in light of what the other party knows or should
know instead of what the agent knows or should
know, . . .
In Comment b. to this Section, it is stated:
fcL, Authority
and
apparent
authority
compared .
. . . [T]here may be apparent
authority
created
by
the
principal's
acquiescence in the agent's conduct when this is
known to the third person.
Likewise, if the
principal manifests to the third person that the
agent is authorized to conduct a transaction,
there is apparent authority in the agent . . .
to do the incidental things which ordinarily
accompany the performance of such transaction,
unless the third person has notice that the
agent's authority is limited.
From his conversations with Mr. Bodell, Mr. McOmber knew
that the foreclosure was proceeding.

There was no reason for

him to think that Bodell had withheld authority to do anything
incident to the sale.
Illustration 2. to Comment b. is as follows:
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2.
P sends A, his bookkeeper, to open an
account for $10,000 and to borrow at a newly
established bank, giving him a letter o
introduction to the bank stating that A is
authorized to borrow up to $10,000. He gives no
instructions to A as to the rate of interest but
A knows that P habitually pays 5 per cent. A
presents the letter and borrows $10,000 at 6 per
cent. If 6 per cent is not unreasonable, A has
no authority but has apparent authority to do
so.
Knowing that Associated Tittle was Bodell's agent for purposes
of the foreclosure, there was no reason for McOmber to believe
that any of his acts were not authorized.
Perhaps the apparent authority that Bodell's acts invested
in Associated Title are best described by Comment c. to § 49:

SL>

Inferences from agent's position.

Acts

are interpreted in the light of ordinary human
experience. If a principal puts an agent into,
or knowledgely permits him to occupy, a position
which according to the ordinary habits of
persons in the locality, trade or profession, it
is usual for such an agent to have a particular
kind of authority, anyone dealing with him is
justified in inferring that he has such
authority, in the absence of reason to know
otherwise.
The content of such apparent
authority is a matter to be determined from the
facts.
Mr. McOmber did not attend the trustees sale.

At some time

after it, he was informed that his title in the property had
been extinguished.

If he had checked with the Utah County

Recorder's office, he would have discovered the Trustee's Deed
which recited all the facts of the trustee's sale of which he
had

been

previously

informed

conversations with Mr. Bodell.
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by

notices

to

him

and

in

Mr. McOmber was in no position

to inquire whether Mr. Heiner (acting for Associated Title) had
written authorization to bid at $240,000 or to bid at all.
There certainly was no appearance of irregularity.
contrary,

the

Trust

Deed

carefully

elements of a valid trustee's sale.
bound by the first sale.

recited

all

To the
necessary

Mr. McOmber appeared to be

The district court correctly concluded

that Bodell was bound as well.

POINT III
BODELL RATIFIED THE FIRST TRUSTEE'S SALE AND
THE BID THAT RESULTED IN BODELL'S PURCHASE

Even if Bodell's assertion that Associated Title exceeded
its authority by bidding at the first trustee's sale were valid,
Bodell

clearly

ratified

Associated

Title's purchase

of the

property on behalf of Bodell Construction.
In Moses v. Archie McFarland & Sons, 230 P.2d 571

(Utah

1951), the court stated:
Ratification like original authority need not be
expressed.
Any conduct which indicates assent
by the purported principal to become a party to
the transaction or which is justifiable only if
there is ratification is sufficient.
Even
silence with full knowledge of the facts may
manifest affirmance and thus operate as a
ratification.
Id. at 573-574.

In Lowe v. April Indus., Inc., 531 P.2d 1297, 1299 (Utah
1974), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
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Ratification is expressed or implied. Implied,
where
it
arises
under
circumstances
of
acquiescence or where a duty to disaffirm is not
promptly exercised.
Knowledge, usually, is a
requisite to any form of ratification.
In Lowe f

the

court

held that

a party

with

knowledge

of a

transaction and an agent's acts ratified the agent's acts by
failing to disaffirm them within a reasonable time.

similarly, in Poxey-Layton Co, 3L. Holbrook, 479 p.2d 348
(Utah 1971), the court addressed a claim against the makers of a
note who claimed they were not liable under the note because
their alleged agent improperly and without authority wrote in
payment terms on the note after they had executed it.

The

Supreme Court held that the makers of the note had ratified
their agent's act by executing extensions of the note after
learning that their alleged agent had inserted the payment terms
about which they objected.
These cases stand for the proposition that when a party,
with knowledge of an alleged unauthorized act of his agent, by
his

conduct

indicates

ratification occurs.

that

he

affirms

the

agent's

act, a

"Any conduct which indicates assent by the

purported principal to become a party to the transaction or
which

is

justifiable

only

if

there

is

ratification

is

sufficient." Moses v. Archie McFarland & Sona, supra at 574.
The application of the doctrine is especially clear when
the party challenging the agent's authority accepts the benefits
of the agent's exercise of such authority.
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In Moses v. Archie

MnFarland

& Sons, 230 P.2d

571, 575

(Utah 1951), the Utah

Supreme Court held that when an agent acts without authority,
the principal cannot confirm such part of his action as is
beneficial

and

reject

such

part

as

is

detrimental

ratification of part of the transaction ratifies the whole of
the

transaction.

"If

a

principal

ratifies

part

of

a

transaction, he is deemed to ratify the whole of it." Navrides v
Zurich Ins. Co.r 488 P.2d 637 (Cal. 1971). Similarly, in Floor
v. Mitchell, 41 P.2d 281 (Utah 1935), the court said:
When a principal claims the benefits of a
contract made by his agent, he cannot repudiate
the acts of his agent on the grounds such acts
were unauthorized.
Accepting a contract and
claiming the fruits thereof, the principal takes
with whatever taint attaches to its origin.
Id. at 287.
To the same effect, see Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc.f 100
P.2d 619 (Utah 1940).
Based upon the testimony of Michael Bodell, alone, the
doctrine of ratification clearly applied and validated the bid
made by Associated Title.

Bodell testified that within a week

to ten days after the August 31, 1984 sale, he knew that the
sale had occurred and the amount that Associated had bid on his
behalf at the sale.

He also knew that he had become the owner

of the property by virtue of Associated1s bidding and purchasing
the property

for Bodell at the sale.

With that knowledge,

Bodell proceeded to enjoy the benefits of property ownership.
He, as owner, listed the property for sale as owner, accepted
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and cashed at

least one rent check

from the property.

He

testified that if anyone had offered to purchase the property
for the listed sale price, he would have sold the property to
them. Bodell could not have it both ways.

He cannot assert that

he was the owner of the property and entitled to sell it and
receive rent from it, but if things did not work out as he
hoped, take the position that the bid resulting in his purchase
of the property was unauthorized and he was never the owner.
The record was uncontradicted that this is exactly what
Bodell did.

Notwithstanding his Affidavit

(R.503) filed just

before the final hearing in the district court, in which he says
that

he

gave

specific

instructions

to Mr.

Terry

that

the

possibility of a deficiency be preserved, Mr. Bodell learned
that the entire debt had been bid as soon as he returned to Salt
Lake

City

after

the

sale.

He

states

that

interested in the foreclosure proceedings.

he

was

keenly

However, with full

knowledge of the bid price and the fact that he now owned the
property,

he

proceeded

to

list

it

for

sale

in

Bodell

Construction's name as owner at a price very near the bid price,
i.e. $239,000.

(Bodell Depo. R.589 at 70-72, Exhibit 16.)

listing agreement was signed on September 10, 1984.

(III.)

Bodell testified concerning this listing.
Q

Did you have any input in the price for
which the property was listed?

A

Yes.

Q

That was a number you were agreeable to?
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This
Mr.

A

Yes.

Q

If two days after you signed this document,
let's say on September 12, 1984, somebody
had come to you and said:
Mr. Bodell, I
want to buy this property for $239,000 in
cash, would you have sold it to them?

A

Yes

(Bodell Depo. R.589 at 72.)
However, early in October, Bodell became concerned about
his ability to sell the property at this price.

His testimony

was as follows:
Q

Okay. I want to read, if I can, the entry,
the first entry from October 2, 1984, there
which is on the third page [of Exhibit 13
to Bodell's Deposition (R.589).
The note
read was made by Roger Terry] . It says,
"Mike Bodell called said was really
concerned that home would not sell for
amount of loan balance.
Said he spoke to
his attorney, Richard Rappaport. Said that
Mr. Rappaport told him" either he or we
"should have bid lower than loan balance
if" he or we "felt home would not sell for
more than owed in order to get a deficiency
judgment. Mike requested that I pick him
up and we meet with Mr. Rappaport to see
what we can do to remedy the problem. Meet
1:30 Wednesday." Have I fairly read that?

A

Yes.

Q

Okay. Is that an accurate statement of the
communication from you to Mr. Terry on or
about October 2, 1984?

A

In general it could have been.
gist of it, yes.

Q

Do you see anything there
wrong to you or inaccurate?

A

Nothing inaccurate that I can pick out.
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I mean the

that

appears

Q

As of this date the property was still
listed by you as owner; is that right?

A

I believe so, yes.
•

•

•

Q

Why did you call Mr. Rappaport?

A

Because I wanted to know what we do now
that it's becoming obvious to me that the
property isn't going to solve me debt
problem. Isn't going to be, isn't going to
net us anywhere's near what is owed us. So
the next step was, well, how do we get the
difference.

(Bodell Depo. R.589 at 76-78.)
In short, the record was uncontradicted that Mr. Bodell was
concerned to undo what he believed had been accomplished, i.e.,
the sale to, and the acceptance by, Bodell Construction of the
McOmber property.
In his brief, Bodell contends that no intent to ratify was
shown, or that the existence of such intent raises a question of
fact.

The rule that "a ratification requires the principal to

have knowledge of all material facts and an intent to ratify" is
found in Bradshaw

v. McBride, 649 P.2d

74, 78

(Utah 1982),

citing Jones v. Mutual Creamery Co.f 81 Utah 223, 17 P.2d 256
(1932) .

The Mutual

Creamery case involved a claim that the

creamery was liable for injuries sustained by a child run over
by a man under contract with the creamery to pick up eggs from
farmers and deliver them to the creamery.

The man used his own

truck, set his own hours, and was paid by the crate of eggs
delivered.

After the accident
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in question, the

contractor

continued to the farm which was his original destination, picked
up the eggs, and delivered them to the creamery.

The creamery

accepted the eggs without being informed of the accident and
with no other knowledge that the accident had occurred.

To the

contention that the creamery had ratified the relation of master
and servant between it and the contractor, the court said:
It is well recognized that, in order that a
ratification
of
an unauthorized
act
or
transaction of an agent or of another may be
valid and binding, it is essential that the
principal or the person making the ratification
had full knowledge at the time of the
ratification
of
all material
facts
and
circumstances relative to the unauthorized act
or transaction (2 C. J. 476) and also that an
intention to ratify is essential and which must
be shown either by an express or by an implied
ratification
12 C. J. 484, 492). . . . [W]here
he accepts the act or contract and seeks t o
enforce it or claims the benefit of it. he is
required to accept the whole of the transaction
or contract, which, when ratified, will also
bind the other party thereto, to the same extent
as though it had been previously authorized.
17 P. 2d at 259.

(Empahsis added.)

As with the element of

intent in other circumstances, intent to ratify can be inferred
from the acts of the person ratifying.
Bodell claims that his action in reconveying the property
to Associated Title shows he had no intent to ratify.

This act

occurred only after the acts of accepting title to the property,
listing the property for sale, and accepting rents from it, and
occurred only after Bodell realized that the property was not
worth what Associated Title had bid for it.
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A deliberate and valid ratification with full
knowledge of all the material facts is binding
and cannot afterward be revoked or recalled.

Stark v. Starr, U.S. 477, 24 L.Ed. 276.
Bradshaw v, McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 78 (Utah 1982).
There can be no doubt that Bodell ratified the trustee's
purchase of the property with full knowledge of the pertinent
facts,
Okay. So would it be a fair stcitement then
that during the week or ten days after the
first sale on August 31, 1984, you knew,
were concerned about and objected to the
amount that was bid at that sale?
Again, prior to?
During the week or ten days following the
first sale you knew, objected to and were
concerned about the amount that had been
bid?
I believe I testified that I am not certain
the time frame, but approximately a week,
week and half after, yes. Whether I first
heard about that the sale was done and the
amount I immediately objected to it.
Okay.
So when you signed the listing of
the property as owner you knew that the bid
price had been wrong and that you didn't
like it; isn't that correct?
Yes.
And when you accepted the $200 rent check
and cashed it, you knew that the bid price
was wrong and that you objected to it; is
that correct?
I don't remember the time frames and the
enter-relationship [sic].
You got the rent check according to Exhibit
17 and your testimony over three weeks
after the trustee's sale.
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A

Okay.

Q

If that is an accurate statement would it
not be fair to say that when you cashed the
check you knew that the bid price was wrong
and you objected to it?

A

I think that would be logical.

(Bodell Depo. R.589 at 79-81.)
Bodell's

other

line of attack

on the district

court's

conclusion that he ratified the sale is to claim a violation of
the statute of frauds (§ 25-5-1 U.C.A. 1953).

Associated Title

was given authority to purchase the property by the trust deed
(Bodell Depo. R.589, Exhibit

3) and the subsequent

appointment of it as successor trustee
required by Utah statute

(Xd..f Exhibit 7) as

(§ 57-1-22, U.C.A.). Bodell does not

contend that either the trust deed or appointment
revoked.

written

was ever

Assuming for the sake of argument only the correctness

of Bodell's contention that the bid or the bid price exceeded
Associated

Title's

authority,

Bodell

nevertheless

does

not

contend that the authorization to bid or to bid at a certain
price must be in the original writing or in a separate writing.
(Authority of a trustee to bid is set forth in § 57-1-27(1)
U.C.A. (1953)).

Accordingly, the ratification of the bid or the

bid price need not be in a separate writing.

Indeed, the only

necessary writings were present at the outset and throughout the
foreclosure.
POINT IV
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BODELL CANNOT NULLIFY THE AUGUST 31 r

1984

TRUSTEE'S SALE QN THE GROUNDS QF ITS OWN MISTAKE AND
CONDUCT A SECOND SALE FOR ITS OWN ADVANTAGE
At about the same time the district court entered its final
judgment in the instant case, this Court issued its opinion in
Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217 (Utah App.
1990). The operative facts in both cases are remarkably similar.
In the Mehr case, as here, the beneficiary, Occidental/Nebraska,
bid in virtually the entire amount of its claim against the
trustors (Mehrs) .

As here, a second trustees sale was arranged

and a substantially lower bid was entered at the second sale.
The basis for abrogating the first sale and holding a second
was, however, somewhat different.

Insofar as the facts stated

in opinion show, Occidental/Nebraska never admitted that the
reason for conducting the second sale was that its bid at the
first was too high.

Mr. Bodell, on the other hand, candidly

admits that he was motivated by these considerations.
Depo. R.58 9 at 73.)

(Bodell

Occidental/Nebraska discovered that it had

made a mistake in the foreclosure procedures by scheduling the
first sale two months rather than the statutory three months
after notice of default.

It is uncontroverted in the instant

case that the sale complied in all respects with Utah statute.
Here, the mistake was allegedly made by the trustee, and Bodell
wants to disavow the authority of the trustee.
In the Occidental/Nebraska decision, this Court said:
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Generally in legal proceedings a party with
knowledge of all the facts will not be allowed
to take a position, pursue that position to
fruition, and later, with no substantial change
in circumstance, return to attack the validity
of the prior position or the outcome flowing
from it. See 28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver
§§ 68-70.
791 P.2d at 220.
As with Occidental/Nebraska, Bodell attacks the validity of
his

own

agent's

acts

that

he

initially

accepted

with

no

substantial change in circumstances to justify this change in
position.
Quoting

Jones v. Johnson, 761 P.2d 37, 41 n.2

(Ut.App.

1988), the Occidental/Nebraska opinion noted that:
The "detailed procedural requirements for a
trustee's sale of real property are intended to
protect the debtor/trustor. " . . .
The
objective of the notice requirements is to
protect the rights of those with an interest in
the property to be sold.
791 P.2d at 220 and citing Concepts, Inc. v. First Sec.

Realty

Servs. Inc., 743 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1987), the opinion stated the
rule that
A sale once made will not be set aside unless
the interests of the debtor were sacrificed or
there was some fraud or unfair dealing. Id.
791 P.2d at 221.
Here,

Bodell

has

not

impairment

of the

interests of the debtors.

reasonably have done so.
Brief

of Appellant,

alleged

unfair

dealings

or

the

He could not

He does, at various places in his

imply that the
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rights

of the

trustors

(defendants-appellees)

can be disregarded

because they

were

passive bystanders in the foreclosure proceedings and did not
take any overt steps with regard to it, see e.g. p.25 of Brief
of Appellant where Bodell argues that since neither Snelson nor
McOmber had much to do with the sale, their position could not
have changed as required to find apparent authority.
The Occidental/Nebraska decision recognizes that because
the trustors must necessarily be in a passive position with
respect to the sale, the detailed procedural requirements were
meant and will be construed to protect them.

Moreover, once a

sale is completed a strong presumption of its validity arises
unless an irregularity prejudicing the trustors is shown, or
facts amounting to deception or fraud can be established.
this action, the trustee's deed

In

filed with the Utah County

Recorder on September 11, 1984 (Bodell Depo. R.589, Exhibit 14),
one day after Mr. Bodell signed the listing agreement for the
sale of the property,

recites

complete

compliance

with the

statutory requirements for a trust deed foreclosure, and these
recitals have never been challenged.
Two cases from other jurisdictions support the rule that a
beneficiary cannot hold a second sale merely because it did not
like the results of the first sale.

The first case is Bank of

Myrtle Point v. Security Bank of Coos County, 718 p.2d 1373
(Or.App. 1986).

There, the defendant, Security Bank, had made

a loan in the amount of $12,000 secured by a trust deed.
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The

plaintiff, Myrtle Bank, subsequently obtained two mortgages on
the same property from the same borrowers.

Then Security Bank

consolidated the original $12,000 loan with other obligations
and the borrowers defaulted on the entire loan.

Security Bank

then bid at the trustee's sale it initiated the entire debt
which the borrowers owed it.

After the sale, the plaintiff,

Myrtle Bank, made demand upon Security Bank for the amount by
which the bid exceeded $12,000, since it was senior to Security
Bank for all liens except the original $12,000.

After this

demand, Security Bank elected to re-advertise and resell the
land, and in order to accomplish that, Security Bank conveyed
the land back to the trustee by a "deed of reconveyance."
The principal question before the Oregon Court was whether
the second trustee's sale was valid.

The court held that it was

not:
Security Bank's bid and its acceptance by Stone
[the trustee] constituted a sale of the
property,
ORS
86.755,
which
terminated
plaintiff's interest in it. . . . Furthermore,
both for trustee's and sheriff's sales under
trust deeds and mortgages, . . . a bidder is
bound by a bid at the sale in the absence of
fraud or misrepresentation.
A mistake on the part of the mortgagee
his attorney in bidding more than
intended will not itself
justify
application or action by the mortgagee
set aside the sale.

or
he
an
to

The making of such a bid at a non-judicial
foreclosure sale 'finally fixes the value
of the property therein sold' and clearly
obligates the trustee who conducts the sale
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to account . . . for the excess.
Aneill
Ranch v. Pet.itf 64 Cal.App.3d 277, 294, 134
Cal.Rptr. 456 (1976).
(Citations omitted.)
See also Osborne, Mortgages, 740 § 344 (2d Ed.
1970); 2 Wiltsie, supra, at 1432, § 891. None
of the parties has raised issues of fraud or
misrepresentation.
Regardless of a mistake in

the amount of its bid, Security is bound by it.
(Emphasis added.)

Bank of Myrtle Point v, Sec, Bank of Coos County. 718 P.2d 1373,
1377-78 (Or.App. 1986).
in Flaherty v, Davenport, 199 N.W. 904 (Minn. 1924), the
facts

are again

quite

similar

to those before

this Court.

There, the plaintiff had applied to the trial court to set aside
a

foreclosure

sale on the ground that

authority to bid the property for him.

his attorney

had no

The court disposed of

the agency question without much discussion and took up the
question of whether a mistake in the bid by the attorney as
sufficient grounds for relief from the foreclosure:
The claim, in substance, is that plaintiff had
failed to inform his Minnesota attorney of the
rendition of the Iowa judgment, and had failed
to notify him of the amount to bid at the sale.
In his affidavit plaintiff states:
That

affiant

informed

his

had not
attorney

finally
for

advised

how

much

or
he

should bid in said premises, and had not
authorized him at the date to bid it in for
the full amount of principal, interest, and
costs of the foreclosure proceedings.
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That an attorney authorized to bid in property
at a foreclosure sale, without instructions as
to the amount to be bid, bids it in for the full
amount of the claim, furnishes no ground for
setting aside the sale.
199 N.W. at 904.
The case before this Court is virtually identical to the
Bank of Myrtle Point and the Flaherty case.

It is significant

to note that here, as in Bank of Myrtle Point, the beneficiary
made no attempt whatsoever to obtain the consent of the trustor
before purporting to set aside the first trustee's sale and
conduct a second.
Also, plaintiff fails to indicate how the reconveyance of
the property from the beneficiary to the trustee, by way of a
quit-claim deed, would reinstate the interest of the trustors
(the defendants).
cannot

be

If these interests were not reinstated, they

affected

by

the

second

trustee's

sale.

The

defendants' interests in the property were fully and finally
terminated by the first trustee's sale and that sale must be the
touchstone upon which any further claims against the defendants
are based.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that Associated Title had actual authority and
apparent authority to enter the bid on August 31, 1984.

Even if

that authority had been lacking on that day, Associated Title's
acts

were

subsequently

ratified
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by

Bodell.

In

these

circumstances,

plaintiff

cannot

set

aside

the

sale

merely

because it was unhappy with it.
Respectfully

submitted

this

JJ^L
DUNN & DUNN

J.v RAND HIRSCHI
Attorney for
Appellee Snelson
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